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That the state did "help" sectarian groups under the Champaign program cannot be seriously questioned; the threat of the truant officer if the
released pupil did not attend his religious instruction, and the solicitation
of pupils by secular teachers in the public schools are examples of that
"help."
But how does the state "help" religious groups in New York? The verb
signifies some type of affirmative action which, though admittedly present
under the Champaign system, does not evidence itself in the New York
case. There the regulations set out specifically that the classes may not be
held within the public schools,2-' .that the classes were never to be mentioned by teachers or principals, 27 and that the public school system declined any responsibility for the released students' attendance in classes
of religious instruction.2s The only "help" which can be said to have been

rendered by the New York City Board of Education is a purely passive
and negative allowance of the program to operate if and how it can.
The Supreme Court expresses this same view of the "help" rendered in
the instant case, and goes on to conclude the opinion with:
We follow the McCollum case. But we cannot expand it to cover the present
released time program unless separation of Church and State means that public
institutions can make no adjustments of their schedules to accomodate the religious needs of the people. We cannot
read into the Bill of Rights such a
2
philosophy of hostility to religion. 9
TORTS-RIGHT OF UNEMANCIPATED CHILD TO SUE
HIS PARENT FOR PERSONAL TORT
Plaintiff, a minor seven years of age, instituted an action by his next
friend against his father and another. Defendants were partners in a business which required the maintenance of a gasoline pump on the premises
of the family home where plaintiff resided. Although the father knew that
plaintiff and other children often played near the pump, he was negligent
in its operation. As a result, a fire originated near the pump and severely
burned plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that an unemancipated
child has the right to sue his parent for negligence in the latter's business
or vocational capacity. Signs V. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743
(1952).
From the early common law, the law has recognized the right of an
unemancipated minor child to bring a tort action against the parent in
matters affecting property.' It has also been held that actions for per26 Note 9 supra.
27 Note 16 supra.
2

SNote 15 supra.

29

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
1 Lusk v. Lusk, 113 V. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); Preston v. Preston, 102
Conn. 96, 128 At. 292 (1925); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895);
Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859); Prosser, Torts § 99 (1941).
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sonal torts may be maintained between unemancipated brothers and sisters,2 and in Munsert v. Farmers' Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,8 parents
were allowed to recover in an action against one unemancipated child for
causing the death of another. There is no doubt that an emancipated
minor is free from disability to maintain an action for personal injuries
against his parents.4 However, as to the right of an unemancipated child to
sue his parents for personal torts, courts disagree and the law is in a state
of development.
Hewlett v. George,5 decided in 1891, represents the first case wherein
an American court refused to give relief to a child, not yet emancipated,
in a personal tort action against a parent. In that case, the minor's mother
wrongfully placed her in an insane asylum; subsequently, the daughter
sued for false imprisonment. Without citing a single authority, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that as long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and control the child, and the child is under the
reciprocal obligation to aid, comfort, and obey, no such action could be
maintained. The court went on to state that the peace of society and of the
families composing it and a sound public policy forbid the minor child to
sue for civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the
parent. The state, through criminal prosecution, would give the child protection from parental violence.
This reasoning was upheld in McKelvey v. McKelvey, 6 where a father
who brutally beat his minor child was held to be immune from civil
liability. And, in Roller v. RollerJ a child could not sue her father although he had raped her. It was contended that the child was emancipated
because the act of rape disrupted the normal harmonious family relationship. The court, however, insisted on uniformity and did not desire to
establish a rule which would vary with the degree of the tort. It feared
that such a policy would lead to "confusion." The bulk of American au2 Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E. 2d 254 (1939); Munsert v. Farmers'
Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938); Belke v. Knaack,
207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932).
3229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938).
4
Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A. 2d 586 (1948); Cannon v. Cannon,
287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E. 2d 236 (1942); Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W.
1 (1932); Skillin v. Skillin, 130 Me. 223, 154 At. 570 (1931); Hewlett v. George,
68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).

668 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
6 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
7 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).

8This decision has met much disfavor in the following cases: Mahnke v. Moore,
77 A. 2d 923 (Md., 1951); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950);
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atd. 905 (1930); Matarese v. Matarese, 47
R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925).
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thority has followed the Hewlett case and the rationale expounded
therein.9
It is interesting to note that many of the American courts refer to the
rule of the Hewlett case as "the common law rule."' 0 Nevertheless, argument has been made that there never existed such a rule at common law. 1'
In fact, some authorities assert that there were no objections to such
actions before 1891.12
While the rationale of the Hewlett case was being followed in many
jurisdictions in the United States, dissenting voices were heard. Disagreeing with the majority opinion of the court, Justice Crownhart, in Wick v.
Wick,'3 could see no valid reason why a child could not sue a parent for
injuries resulting from the latter's negligence. He felt that the views that
such actions might disturb cherished concepts of family unity or be contrary to public policy were overridden by modem concepts of individual
rights and remedies. The justice added that the fact that the defendant
was protected by insurance justified modification. Although recovery
4
based on the father's negligence was denied in Sorrentino v.Sorrentino,1
Justices Cardozo, Crane, and Andrews dissented without opinions in this
New York case.' 5
Today, courts seem to distinguish negligence cases from those involving wilful torts. Generally, an unemancipated minor cannot sue a parent
for negligence36 On the other hand, in recent years, indications have appeared of a growing judicial inclination to depart very materially from
the broad doctrine of parental immunity in tort actions and some decisions
have allowed recovery for negligence. The results in these cases almost
9 Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W. 2d 468 (1938); Mesite v. Kirchenstein,
109 Conn. 77, 145 Ad. 753 (1929); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787
(1927); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Chastain v. Chastain,
50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E.
128 (1924).
10Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W. 1 (1932); Kelly v. Kelly, 158
S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905);
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
11 Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A. 2d 923 (Md., 1951); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H.
352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930); Clark, C.J., dissenting in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C.
577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
12Dunlap v.Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930); Prosser, Torts J 99 (1941).
18 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W.787 (1927).
14248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928).

15 See, for a vigorous dissenting opinion by Clark, C.J., Small v.Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
A Baugh v.Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P. 2d 633 (1944); Cannon v.Cannon,
287 N.Y.425, 40 N.E. 2d 236 (1942); Luster v.Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 NE.2d
438 (1938); Rambo v.Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W. 2d 468 (1938); Meece v.
Holland Furnace Co., 269 1M1.
App. 164 (1933); Foley v. Foley, 61 IM.App. 577

(1895).
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invariably depend on the presence of liability insurance and an additional
relationship besides the parent-child relationship.
In a New Hampshire case, 7 decided in 1930, a minor was permitted to
recover against his parent for injuries sustained in the latter's employ.
Since the father paid premiums on employers' liability insurance and there
existed an employer-employee relationship, the court expressed the opinion that the elements which were usually held to justify the rule favoring
parental immunity were removed. After this decision, similar/results followed in Lusk v. Lusk, 18 and Worrell v. Worrell.19 In the Worrell case,
the court acknowledged the principle that the presence of insurance
creates no cause of action when none otherwise exists,20 but continued to
state that insurance did lessen the burden of the liability on the wrongdoer.
Though American cases agree that a parent or person standing in loco
parentis has the privilege of using corporal punishment to discipline or
correct a child, 21 there is a strong modern and growing tendency to regard
actions for damages maintainable where injury or death was intentionally
caused or resulted from wilful misconduct. 22 This view is based on the
theory that a parent, guilty of wilful misconduct, may be regarded as
having abandoned his parental role and any protection from civil liability
23
deducible from it.
In reaching the decision in the instant case, the Ohio court did not
mention whether the father was protected by liability insurance. Furthermore, it was stated:
17 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930).
18 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
19 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E. 2d 343 (1939).
20Fidelity Say. Bank v. Aulik, 252 Vis. 602, 32 N.W. 2d 613 (1948); Rambo
v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W. 2d 468 (1938); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E. 12 (1923).
21 Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A. 2d 923 (Md., 1951); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366,
206 N.W. 173 (1925); Fortinberry v. Holmes, 89 Miss. 373, 42 So. 799 (1907);
Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Foley v. Foley,
61 111. App. 577 (1895).
22
Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A. 2d 923 (Md., 1951); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore.
282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950); Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W. 2d 245 (1939);
Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913). See Cannon v. Cannon,
287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E. 2d 236 (1942); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162
N.E. 551 (1928).
23Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930). Accord: Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131
Ad. 198 (1925). As early as 1888, in Reeve, The Law of Husband and Wife 375
(4th ed., 1888), it was stated that the parent has the power to chastise the child.
"He may so chastise his child as to be liable in an action by the child against
him for a battery. . . . But when the punishment is, in their opinion, thus unreasonable, and it appears that the parent acted, mala animo,... he ought to
be liable to damages."
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We are not in accord with the reasoning of some of the courts that the
presence or absence of liability insurance should make a difference in respect
to liability, as we are of the opinion that the problem presented to us should
be solved irrespective of the queston... since it does not
have any effect upon
24
the merits of a tort controversy between any parties.
Therefore, in the present tendency to limit or step away from the doctrine of parental immunity, the Signs case stands as a new development in
the law since the court strongly indicates that the question of insurance
should not be considered in an action by an infant against the parent.
It would seem that to allow a child to recover in a justifiable case would
be sound policy. The correct determination of each case should depend
on the facts and circumstances, and rules of thumb should give way to
rules of reason. 25 Judge Cooley states that on principle, there is no reason
26
why an action of a child against a parent should not be sustained.
Legal prohibition alone will not hold together the family life. 27 As was
stated in a Canadian case,28 however repugnant it may be to allow an unemancipated minor to sue his parent, it is equally repugnant that a child,
injured by the parent's negligence, should have no redress though perhaps
he will be maimed for life.
Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 573, 103 N.E. 2d 743, 747 (1952).
Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 SE. 2d 343 (1939).
26 Cooley, Torts 197 (2d ed., 1888).
27 Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E. 2d 254 (1939).
28
Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Marchand, [1924] 4 D.L.R. 157.
24
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